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EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF CIVIL
APPEALS TO ISSUE EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
James R. Norvell*
U NDER the Texas constitutional system, the jurisdiction of
both the Supreme Court and the Courts of Civil Appeals
is primarily appellate in nature and such courts are not invested
with general superintendence of trial courts.' Nevertheless, by
the constitution and statutory enactments, they are granted the
authority to issue original writs under certain circumstances. It
has been pointed out that the authority and jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in this regard is much broader than that of a
Court of Civil Appeals,2 and this seems readily apparent from
a comparison of the constitutional and statutory provisions relat-
ing to the two species of courts.' The constitutional provision
*Associate Justice of the Court of Civil Appeals, Fourth Supreme Judicial District,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Law School of St. Mary's University of
San Antonio, Texas. For assistance in the preparation of this paper, grateful acknowl-
edgment is made to the Briefing Service of the Law School of St. Mary's University,
particularly, Messrs. Robert Vale and Joseph Valdez.
1 Milam County Oil Mill Co. v. Bass, 106 Tex. 260, 163 S. W. 577 (1914) ; Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n. v. Kirby, 150 S. W. 2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
2 Adams v. Mitchell, 86 S. W. 2d 884 (Tex. Civ. App.) 1935; Hidalgo County
Water Improvement Dist. No. 2 v. Cameron County Water Control and Improvement
Dist. No. 5, 250 S. W. 2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
8 The constitutional provision relating to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is contained in Article 5, § 3, of the Constitution and reads as follows:
"The Supreme Court and the Justices thereof shall have power to issue writs of
habeas corpus, as may be prescribed by law, and under such regulations as may
be prescribed by law, the said courts and the Justices thereof may issue the writs
of mandamus, procedendo, certiorari and such other writs, as may be necessary to
enforce its jurisdiction. The Legislature may confer original jurisdiction on the
Supreme Court to issue writs of quo warranto and mandamus in such cases as may
be specified, except as against the Governor of the State."
Statutory enactments adopted in accordance with the constitutional grant of power
are the following:
"Article 1733. May issue writs.-The Supreme Court or any Justice thereof, shall
have power to issue writs of procedendo, certiorari and all writs of quo warranto
or mandamus agreeable to the principles of law regulating such writs, against any
district judge, or Court of Civil Appeals or judges thereof, or any officer of the
State Government, except the Governor."
"Article 1734. May issue mandamus, etc.-Said Court of any judge thereof in
vacation may issue the writ of mandamus to compel a judge of the district court
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relating to: the original jurisdiction of the Courts of Civil Appeals
is contained in Article 5, § 6, of the Constitution which, after
defining the appellate jurisdiction, simply states that such courts
"shall have such other jurisdiction, original and appellate as
may be prescribed by law."
In accordance with this constitutional provision, the Legisla-
ture has adopted two articles reading as follows:
Article 1823.4 Writs of mandamus, etc.-Said courts and the
judges thereof may issue writs of mandamus and all other writs
necessary to enforce the jurisdiction of said courts.
Article 1824. May madamus district courts-Said Courts or any
Judge thereof, in vacation, may issue the writ of Mandamus to compel
a Judge of the District or County Court to proceed to trial and judg-
ment in a cause, returnable as the nature of the case may require.5
It will be seen that the Courts of Civil Appeals are given no
authority by the constitution or the statutes to issue the writ of
habeas corpus.' Their authority is strictly confined to writs neces-
sary to enforce their jurisdiction and writs directing a District
or County Court to proceed to judgment in a case.
to proceed to trial and judgment in a cause agreeably to the principles and usages
of law, returnable to the Supreme Court on or before the first day of the term,
or during the session of the same, or before any judge of the said Court as the
nature of the case may require."
Article 1735 ... relates to the issuance of the writs of mandamus and injunction
against public officials.
Article 1735-a, . . . relates to the issuance of mandamus or other writ against
officers of political parties.
"Article 1737. Habeas corpus, - The Supreme Court or any of the Justices
thereof, either in term time or in vacation, may issue writs of habeas corpus in any
case where any person is restrained in his liberty by virtue of any order, process or
commitment issued by any court or judge on account of the violation of any order,judgment or decree theretofore made, rendered or entered by such court or judge
in any civil cause. Said Court or any Justice thereof, either in term time or in
vacation, pending the hearing of application for such writ, may admit to bail any
person to whom the writ of habeas corpus may be so granted."
4Article References are to VEnNoN's ANrOTATED TEXAS STATUTM.
5 Under the provisions of Article 1735-a, Courts of Civil Appeals, as well as the
Supreme Court, are granted the power to issue original writs against officers of a
political party. A discussion of this article is however beyond the scope of this paper.
6Wetz v. Thompson, 63 S. W. 1050 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901); Ex parte Hoover,
245 S. W. 2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
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Despite the broader jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, there is
a field of concurrent jurisdiction which it occupies with the Courts
of Civil Appeals. If the extraordinary relief sought falls within
this area of concurrent jurisdiction, it is generally necessary to
apply first to the Court of Civil Appeals having jurisdiction of
the case.' While the Supreme Court has no appellate jurisdiction
over a case originating in the Court of Civil Appeals,' it may
nevertheless entertain an original proceeding designed to secure
the same relief refused in an original proceeding in the Court of
Civil Appeals9 or prohibit the carrying out of an order of a Court
of Civil Appeals rendered in an original proceeding."0
Ordinarily before a Court of Civil Appeals will issue an origi-
nal writ it is necessary that either an order of a Court of Civil
Appeals be interfered with or an interference threatened." An
order or judgment of a trial court becomes in theory an order of
the Court of Civil Appeals when the jurisdiction of the latter
Court is invoked by appellate proceedings. Consequently, when
an order of the trial court is involved, it is generally necessary
to perfect an appeal before the Court of Civil Appeals will grant
7 Houtchens v. Mercer, 119 Tex. 244, 27 S. W. 2d 795 (1930) ; 69 A. L. R. 1103.
8 Dallas Railway and Terminal Co. v. Watkins, 126 Tex. 116, 86 S. W. 2d 1081
(1935); Alexander v. Meredith, 137 Tex. 37, 152 S. W. 2d 732 (1941).
) Houtchens v. Mercer, supra; Dallas Railway and Terminal Co., supra; Saenz v.
Sanders, 241 S. W. 2d 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951), Id. Sup. Ct., 151 Tex. 10, 245 S. W.
2d 483 (1952).
10 Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 285 S. W. 1063 (1926).
11 Cattlemen's Trust Company v. Willis, 179 S. W. 1115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915);
National Surety Corporation v. Jones, 158 S. W. 2d 112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) ; Harney
v. Wood, 160 S. W. 2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) ; Clack v. Ewing, 196 S. W. 2d 53(Tex. Civ. App. 1946). Ordinarily the filing of a second suit which may be defeated
by a plea of res judicata is not grounds for the issuance of a writ of prohibition, how.
ever, repeated filings of lawsuits upon the same cause of action may form a basis for
the issuance of a writ. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 189 S. W. 2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
As stated in Milam County Oil Mill Co. v. Bass, 106 Tex. 260, 163 S. W. 577 (1914),
"The proper test of the question therefore is, not whether the suit (sought to be pro-
hibited) recognizes or repudiates the effect of the judgment (of the appellate court),
since that does not necessarily involve the jurisdiction of the court, but whether it
amounts to an interference with its due enforcement and therefore invades a jurisdic-
tion it is forbidden to trench upon."
As to Supreme Court, see, Hovey v. Shepherd, 105 Tex. 237, 147 S. W. 224 (1912).
12 Browning-Ferris Machinery Co. v. Thompson, 55 S. W. 2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App.
1932) ; City and County of Dallas v. Cramer, 207 S. W. 2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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relief by issuing an original writ.'" After perfection of appeal
an injunction to maintain the status quo or to preserve the corpus
of the subject matter of the litigation is considered as a writ in
aid of the jurisdiction of the appellate court.' 4
In accordance with the general rule that extraordinary writs
will not issue if other adequate remedies are available, the writ
of mandamus or injunction will not lie if relief by way of appeal
may be had,'" nor may such writs be substituted for the statutory
remedy of supersedeas."6
The mere prevention of damage to the losing party in the
court below is likewise an insufficient basis for the issuance of
an original writ" and ordinarily such writ will not issue when
its effect would be to grant injunctive relief which the trial judge
has directly considered and refused." A writ of prohibition may
be issued to prevent a trial court from interfering with the judg-
ment or subject matter of the suit after the jurisdiction of the Court
of Civil Appeals has attached thereto. 9 Although as a general
proposition a Court of Civil Appeals has no authority to issue
extraordinary writs to trial courts without its territorial jurisdic-
tion, it has been held that when, under the provisions of Article
1824, a Court of Civil Appeals directs a trial court within its
territorial jurisdiction to proceed to trial and judgment, it pos-
sesses the ancillary power to protect its jurisdiction under Article
1823, and prohibit other trial courts from interfering with the
trial of the case as directed, even though such courts may be
13 Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n. v. Kirby, 150 S. W. 2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
14 Ford v. State, 209 S. W. 490 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
15 First Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 255 S. W. 807 (Tex' Civ. App. 1923); Yturria
Town & Improve- -nt Co. v. Hidalgo County, 114 S. W. 2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
1' Anderson v. Pioneer Building and Loan Ass'n., 150 S. W. 2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941) error ref. w.o.m.; Georgian Oil Corp. v. Chemical Process Co., 151 S. W. 2d 280
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
17 Tipton v. Railway Postal Clerks Inv. Ass'n., 170 S. W. 113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
's Shelton v. City of Abilene, 75 S. W. 2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) ; Yturria Town
and Improvement Co. v. Hidalgo County, 114 S. W. 2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
19 Jackson v. Equitable Trust Co., 106 S. W. 2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
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beyond the territorial limits of the Supreme Judicial District in
which the Court of Civil Appeals is located.2 °
The authority conferred upon the Courts of Civil Appeals by
Article 1824 to direct a district judge to proceed to trial and
judgment seems to be a developing jurisdiction, particularly in
those cases in which a conflict of jury findings is asserted or
denied. This situation is not, however, the only one to which the
article has application. It has been invoked in requiring a district
judge to proceed to trial in an election contest when his refusal
to proceed was based upon a mistaken belief that the effect of a
statute was to stay such proceedings.2' In a suit tried upon the
merits and a plea of privilege at the same time, the district court
has been ordered to proceed to judgment on the merits rather
than to merely sustain the plea of privilege.22 The propriety
of the district judge's action in staying proceedings until a party
answers questions propounded to him by deposition may be tested
by application for mandamus in the appellate courts.2" The failure
of a district judge to carry out the peremptory instructions of a
Court of Civil Appeals in rendering judgment may also be made
the basis of mandamus seemingly under the provisions of both
Articles Nos. 1823 and 1824.24 Various additional illustrations
20 Rathbun v. Boyd, 155 S. W. 2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). In connection with
prohibition, see Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n. v. Kirby, 150 S. W. 2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941) ; Ibid. Sup. Ct., 137 Tex. 106, 152 S. W. 2d 1073 (1941), holding that potential
jurisdiction alone is insufficient to support the issuance of the writ of prohibition, but
that the active jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Appeals must be invoked. Also see
South End Development Co. v. Holland, 248 S. W. 2d 1013 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), and
dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Bond in Fishbein v. Thornton, 247 S. W. 2d 404
(Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
21 Gonzales v. Laughlin, 256 S.W. 2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
22 Aycock v. Graham, 250 S. W. 2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
28 Saenz v. Sanders, 241 S. W. 2d 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) ; Id. Sup. Ct., 151 Tex.
10, 245 S. W. 2d 483 (1952).
24 Brock v. Briggs, 223 S. W. 2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
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could be given,25 however, the usual case is not one in which a
trial court has wilfully refused to proceed with a trial, but rather
one in which there is a bona fide dispute as to the jurisdiction of
the lower court or as to the proper interpretation of a jury's find-
ings. The trial courts are vested with a broad discretion relating
to the control and disposition of their dockets and the authority
of the appellate courts to order a judge to proceed to trial and
judgment is exercised with this extensive discretion in mind. Such
authority is also ordinarily restricted to the issuance of an order
requiring the judge of the lower court to proceed to trial and judg-
ment agreeable to the principles and usages of law, but not to
dictate the terms or nature of the judgment. 6 There is one seem-
ing exception to the rule stated. Whenever the rendition of the
judgment involves no judicial discretion, but is purely ministerial,
the same may be compelled by mandamus.27 The most common
25 A district judge has been ordered to determine a contest relating to a pauper's
affidavit in lieu of appeal bond despite his belief that he had no jurisdiction to do so.
Cox v. Hightower, 47 S. W. 1048 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898). In Humphrey v. Rawlins,
88 S. W. 2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), and Citizens State Bank v. Miller, 115 S. W.
2d 1183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), district courts were ordered to proceed to trial despite
void orders changing venue and dismissing suit, respectively. Allied Store Utilities
Co. v. Hunt, 148 S. W. 2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), provides an example of a
mandatory order to proceed to trial despite an invalid default judgment. While a
default judgment cannot be ordered because a judicial function is involved, i.e., that
of passing upon the legal sufficiency of the petition, it seems that the question of proper
service of citation may be determined by mandamus in certain cases. Rushing v. Bush,
260 S. W. 2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error dism.; Harmon & Reed v. Quin, 258
S. W. 2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). The Supreme Court case of Dallas Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Phillips, 124 Tex. 106, 76 S. W. 2d 1038 (1934), is illustrative of that
class of cases in which an order to proceed to trial and judgment despite an invalid
statutory order. In the particular case, a moratorium cast was involved.
26 "When an inferior court declines to exercise his jurisdiction, mandamus is an
appropriate remedy to compel the judge to act, but the writ can not be used to control
his judicial discretion in the manner of the performance of the duty." First Nat. Bank
v. Chapman, 255 S. W. 807 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) ; Robert v. Monroe, 193 S. W. 734
(Tex. Civ. App. 1917) error dism.; Pollard v. Speer, 207 S. W. 620 (Tex. Civ. App.
1918) ; Allen v. Strode, 62 S W. 2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) ; Knox v. Craven, 248
S. W. 2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Hidalgo County Water Imp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Cameron County Water Control & Imp. Dist. No. 5, 250 S. W. 2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952).
27 In the technical sense, the "rendition of judgment" is by definition a judicial act.
Coleman v. Zapp, 105 Tex. 491, 151 S. W. 1040 (1912), but the phrase is herein used
as meaning the setting forth the action of a judicial tribunal in proper form.
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instance of this use of the writ is the rendition of judgment upon
a verdict."
We here point out a matter of importance which is largely
historical in nature. Mandamus will issue only to compel the
performance of a ministerial act and can not be used to control
judicial discretion. However, the rendition of judgment upon a
general verdict was regarded as a ministerial act compellable by
mandamus.29 Generally the mandate to render such judgment was
tantamount to commanding that judgment, be entered either for
the plaintiff or the defendant in accordance with the jury's gen-
eral finding. Strictly speaking, the writ would extend only to an
order to proceed to render judgment, and, of course, if some dis-
cretionary act was incident to such rendition, the writ of manda-
mus could not control the same further than to require action.80
The same rule is applied to special issue verdicts. However, as
under the special issue practice, those matters established by
uncontroverted evidence are not submitted to the jury, the Court
of Civil Appeals, if it is to exercise the same authority over a
special issue verdict as it does over a general verdict, must at
times necessarily determine if a particular issue be established
28 "Ordinarily it is a correct proposition to say that the higher court cannot control
the lower court as to the character of the judgment to be entered, though it be conceded
that the power exists to order the lower court to proceed to judgment. But where, as in
this case, on the verdict of the jury, the entry of the judgment is merely a ministerial
act, the power exists to order that judgment be entered in favor of the party entitled
to it under the verdict of the jury." Allen v. Strode, 62 S. W. 2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933), following Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Canty, 115 Tex. 537, 285 S. W.
296 (1926).
Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. v. Watkins, 89 S. W. 2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App. 936),
error ref.; Friske v. Graham, 128 S. W. 2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) ; Chaffin v.
Drane, 131 S. W. 2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n. v.
Stephenson, 178 S. W. 2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Newman, 181 S. W. 2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); Willis v. Granger, 195 S. W. 2d
831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) ; McGregor v. Allen, 195 S. W. 2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946)
error dism.; Fredericksburg Hospital and Clinic v. Springall, 220 S. W. 2d 692 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949) ; American Bottling Co. v. Briggs, 232 S. W. 2d 103 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950); Aycock v. Graham, 250 S. W. 2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
29 Lloyd v. Brinck, 35 Tex. 1 (1871-2) ; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Strycharski, 92
Tex. 1, 37 S. W. 415 (1896) ; Williams v. Wyrick, 151. Tex 40, 245 S. W. 2d 961 (1952).
50 Aycock v. Clark, 94 Tex. 375, 60 S. W. 665 (1901).
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as a matter of law." It is not necessarily a defense to the writ of
mandamus to show that one or more of the issues necessary to
support a judgment is not contained in the jury's special findings.
It is only when the evidence relating to the unsubmitted issue is
conflicting that a mandamus will not issue commanding the rendi-
tion of a judgment for the plaintiff or for the defendant as the
case may be. 2
By way of example, we refer to the illustration contained in
Wichita Falls & Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Pepper,8" wherein it is said
that the controlling fact issues in a negligence case are: "(1) That
the defendant did an act, (2) that the act was an act of negli-
gence, (3) that the act of negligence was the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's damages, and (4) that the plaintiff was damaged"
in a certain ascertained pecuniary amount. If all these issues are
answered by the jury (and assuming no other conflicting issues
are involved), mandamus will issue commanding the rendition
of judgment upon the verdict, which will be tantamount to the
rendition of a judgment for the plaintiff if the jury's findings were
all favorable to him or for the defendant if, for instance, the
jury's answer to the negligence issue or the proximate cause issue
is unfavorable to the plaintiff. 4 If one or more of these ultimate
fact issues be established as a matter of law and consequently
not submitted to the jury, mandamus may nevertheless issue, as
for example: (1) It is undisputed that the defendant did an act,
(2) it is likewise undisputed that the act was an act of negligence,
(3) the jury finds that the act of negligence was a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's damages, and (4) the jury finds that
plaintiff was damaged in the sum of $10,000.00.
Implied fact findings upon unsubmitted issues concerning which
31 O'Meara v. Moore, 142 Tex. 350, 178 S. W. 2d 510 (1944).
82 O'Meara v. Moore, supra.
83 Wichita Falls & Oklahoma Ry. Co. et al, v. Pepper, 134 Tex. 360, 135 S. W. 2d
79 (1940).
84 Kincaid v. Long, 135 S. W. 2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
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there is conflicting evidence result from the judgment,85 and a
trial judge may not be required to render a judgment which would
in effect compel him to make implied findings either for or
against a party. The making of findings, either expressed or
implied, when the evidence is conflicting is the exercise of a
judicial function and is not an act ministerial in nature.
A somewhat different problem would be presented by an appli-
cation to compel rather than control action upon a request for
findings when the evidence is conflicting and certain controlling
issues are not submitted to the jury but in theory left to the
decision of the trial judge. Could the trial judge refuse either to
make express findings or to render judgment (and thus make
implied findings) and simply declare a mistrial? No decided case
has been found controlling to this particular situation. The cir-
cumstances would be admittedly unusual and a litigant might
hesitate to apply for an order from an appellate court directing
a trial court to decide either for him or against him upon con-
flicting evidence rather than accept mistrial. However, it would
seem that theoretically the power to order the judge to make
findings one way or the other under the conditions stated and
thus complete the trial, would be vested in the appellate court.
However, it should be noted that the provision of Rule 279,
relating to findings by the court upon issues not submitted to-the
jury when the evidence is conflicting, is permissively stated."
Of course, when the jury has answered the controlling issues
35Rule 279 reads in part as follows:
"Upon appeal all independent grounds of recovery or of defense not conclu-
sively established under the evidence and upon which no issue is given or requested
shall be deemed as waived; but where such ground of recovery or of defense consists
of more than one issue, if one or more of the issues necessary to sustain such
ground of recovery or of defense, and necessarily referable thereto, are submitted
to and answered by the jury, and one or more of such issues are omitted, without
such request, or objection, and there is evidence to support a finding thereon, the
trial court, at the request of either party, may after notice and hearing and at any
time before the judgment is rendered, make and file written findings on such
omitted issue or issues in support of the judgment, but if no such written findings
are made, such omitted issue or issues shall be deemed as found by the court in
such manner as to support the judgment."
s See portion of rule set forth above.
19541
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submitted to it and its answers are conflicting, a writ of mandamus
to render judgment will not issue," and one of the more common
questions raised in mandamus cases brought under Article 1824,
is whether or not there is a conflict in the jury's findings.
It seems to be generally held that the rendition of judgment
favorable to a party litigant and assertedly based entirely upon
undisputed facts, whether pleaded or proved, calls for the exer-
cise of judicial discretion. Accordingly, mandamus will not lie
compelling the rendition of a judgment by default because the
granting of such judgment "depends on whether or not the peti-
tion stated a cause of action as against a general demurrer, and
the district court was the proper court to determine in the exercise
of judicial discretion, whether or not said petition stated a cause
of action good against a general demurrer.""8 It has also been
held that "the determination by the trial court of the question
whether or not judgment should be rendered for one party or the
other on the undisputed evidence is the performance of an act
which is judicial in character, and is not merely the exercise of
a ministerial duty." 9 Similarly, it has been held that mandamus
will not lie to compel the rendition of a judgment non obstante
veredicto.4°
With regard to the distinction between rendition of judgment
upon a special issue verdict and the rendition of judgment upon
the undisputed evidence, it is perhaps well to point out that as
a logical proposition the evaluating of evidence or the allegations
87 Templeton v. Small, 37 S. W. 2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) ; Kincaid v. Long,
135 S. W. 2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Texas & N. 0. Ry. Co. v. Young, 148 S. W.
2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
"SJackson v. McKinsey, 12 S. W. 2d 1044 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Yantis v. Mc-
Callum, 121 S. W. 2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) ; 28 Tex. Jur. 576. McDonald points
out in his "Texas Civil Practice," Vol. 4, p. 1372, that Rule 90, providing for the
waiver of defects in pleading does not apply as to parties against whom a default
judgment is rendered, but suggests that as the new rules countenance more general
allegations a default will stand and hence may be entered upon a petition which states
a claim upon which the substantative law will give relief and gives fair notice to the
defendant of the basis of the complaint.
s9 Bussan v. Holland, 235 S. W. 2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
,0 American Bottling Co. v. Briggs, 232 S. W. 2d 103 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
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of a pleading in accordance with certain legal standards is essen-
tially a judicial function. Under the general charge system, the
judge determines the law applicable to the case and states the
same in his instructions to the jury.41 After a jury in accordance
with a general charge has returned a verdict for the plaintiff
or the defendant, it may be logically maintained that the rendi-
tion for the party having the verdict is ministerial. It may appear
upon first impression that this process is reversed when the special
issue verdict is used-that the jury determines the facts and there-
after the court applies the law to such facts and renders a proper
judgment. However, the trial judge, in the exercise of a judicial
function must determine which issues should be submitted to the
jury and as a part of such process must necessarily decide if cer-
tain issues are established by the undisputed evidence. This func-
tion is performed before the case is submitted to the jury, the
same as it is when a general charge is used. Upon application for
writ of mandamus the Court of Civil Appeals may consider that
the trial judge in preparing his special issue charge has already
found that certain issues are established by the undisputed evi-
dence. It follows that when the apellate court from an examination
of the pertinent record finds that there is no conflict in the evidence
as to an unsubmitted issue, it will assume that the trial judge
found that the issue was established as a matter of law prior to
the time the charge was submitted to the jury. In this instance,
the trial judge has already acted in a judicial capacity. This situa-
tion is vastly different in principle from the case where the trial
judge has not acted but rendition of a judgment for a particular
party is sought by mandamus upon the theory that the undisputed
facts, either pleaded or proved, show as a matter of law that the
plaintiff or defendant should recover.
In connection with the premises stated, which seem supported
41 This form of submisson is seldom used in the Texas State Courts, but a form
of the general charge in all its magnificent detail, albeit erroneous in one particular,
is set out in Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Washington, 94 Tex.
510, 63 S. W. 534 (1901).
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by the decided cases, namely, that the rendition of judgment upon
either a general or special verdict is a ministerial act but that the
rendition of judgment upon the pleadings or evidence, as a matter
of law, is a judicial act, the comparatively recent case of Ellzey
v. Allen, 2 decided by the Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals in
1943, presents an interesting situation. The plaintiffs asserted
three grounds of liability against defendants, the first was founded
upon a claim for a partnership accounting, the second was a claim
to certain real property, and the third was based upon an asserted
contractual liability. As to the first two theories of recovery,
the plaintiffs conceded that they had failed to make out a case.
Issues relating to the third theory were, however, submitted and
the jury was unable to agree upon answers thereto. The trial
court refused to render a final judgment but, on the contrary,
entered an interlocutory order conclusive of the accounting and
title theories only. On application for writ of mandamus the
plaintiffs in the district court, speaking on behalf of the respon-
dent district judge, stated and agreed that: "The court (of civil
appeals) may assume (a) the case was fully developed; (b) that
the pleadings are as good as can be made by us; (c) that the
evidence is full and complete." It further appears that plain-
tiffs, acting on behalf of the respondent, waived any and all
technicalities and irregularities found in the record and requested
the Court of Civil Appeals to grant the writ if it found the plead-
ings of plaintiff insufficient or that they had not proved a case.
In accordance with this invitation, the Court of Civil Appeals
issued the writ and ordered the district judge to render judg-
ment for the relators who were defendants in the district court.
The district judge held that the pleadings relating to the asserted
contractual liability were sufficient to justify the submission of
this theory to the jury. If we assume this holding to be erroneous,
as held by the Court of Civil Appeals, then how was it to be cor-
rected? By an appeal from a final judgment, as, if and when a
42 Ellzey v. Allen, 172 S. W. 2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error dism.
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judgment against defendants be rendered, or by an original writ
of mandamus ordering the district judge to set aside his inter-
locutory order and render a final judgment for defendants? The
rather far-reaching implications of the case are apparent. The
invitation of the parties to the appellate court, requesting the
exercise of an extensive jurisdiction was met with a correspond-
ingly broad response. The case may stand for the proposition
that where the record entitles a party to judgment as a matter
of law, the rendition of such judgment may be compelled by man-
damus. This is undoubtedly a substantial extension of the
authority of the Courts of Civil Appeals beyond that of directing
a rendition of judgment on the verdict.4"
It has been suggested that the practice followed in Ellzey v.
Allen would constitute a desirable development in Texas proce-
dure.44 On the other hand, the danger of piecemeal trial of cases45
is presented with its consequent inefficient use of the judicial
organization. It has been said with the undoubted support of
experience that trial judges are correct in the overwhelming major-
ity of their rulings and hence for practical purposes a review
of asserted errors may best await the final judgment.
The mechanics involved in applying to the appellate courts for
extraordinary relief through the use of original writs should be
mentioned briefly. In proceedings had under Articles 1823 and
1824, all persons who might be affected by the granting of the
writ applied for should be made parties to the action, including
the judge of the court below, if request be made for a writ di-
rected against him. The Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the
43 The following decisions seem to support a view contrary to that expressed in
Ellzey v. Allen, viz., Jackson v. McKinsey, 12 S. W. 2d 1044 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928);
Yantis v. McCallum, 121 S. W. 2d 610 (Tex. Civ App. 1938) ; and Bussan v. Holland,
235 S. W. 2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
44 29 Tex. Law Review 541 (1951).
45 Phoenix Assur. Co.-V. Stobaugh, 127 Tex.308, 94 -S. d U42 (1936) ; Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n. v. Lightfoot, 139 Tex. 304, 162 S. W. 2d 929 (1942).
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filing of two pleadings in either the Court of Civil Appeals" or
the Supreme Court,'7 namely, a petition for the extraordinary
relief sought, together with a motion for leave to file the same.
The purpose of the motion is to afford the Court an opportunity
to summarily dispose of ill-founded petitions and prevent such
original applications from being utilized for mere harassment
purposes. It is only after leave to file has been granted, that the
cause is placed on the trial docket and notice issued." These origi-
nal writs serve a necessary and effective purpose, but, like all
forms of judicial process, they are subject to mis-application and
abuse which must be guarded against. It has been necessary at
times in the past to wholly discard effective remedies because
the fact of their existence brought forth mis-applications which
resulted in more evil than the good which they accomplished.
Extraordinary remedies should be kept extraordinary, and for
this purpose the special rules relating to applications for these
special writs have been devised.
48 Rule 383. Original Proceedings-A petition seeking to institute an original
proceeding in the Court of Civil Appeals shall be presented to the clerk, accompanied
with a motion for leave to file, and such written argument in behalf of the motion
as may be desired. The motion shall be filed and, together with the petition and argu-
ment, if any, sent at once to the consultation room for the action of the court. If the
court should be clearly of the opinion that the facts stated in the petition entitle peti-
tioner to the relief sought, the motion will be granted, the petition filed, and the cause
placed upon the trial docket. Otherwise the motion will be denied.
47 Rule 474. Original Proceedings.-A petition seeking to institute an original pro-
ceeding for writ of mandamus, prohibition, injunction, and other like proceedings in
the Supreme Court shall be presented to the Clerk, accompanied with a motion for leave
to file, and such written argument in behalf of the motion may be desired. The motion
will be filed and, together with the petition and argument, if any, will be sent at once
to the consultation room for the action of the court. If the court should be clearly of
the opinion that the facts set out in the petition entitle petitioner to the relief
sought, the motion will be granted, the petition filed, and the cause placed upon the
trial docket. Otherwise the motion will be overruled . * * *
48 Rules 383 and 474, supra.
